Robert Clowes


As the Internet becomes the pervasive background to so many of our cognitive activities, it moves beyond simply being a tool and becomes a new sort of cognitive ecology. Our deepening reliance upon it, reshapes many of our cognitive activities and this provokes profound changes in our sense of self and agency, even in who and what at we are as persons In the process we may be becoming Internet Extended Persons. This article uses some of the theoretical resources of 4E cognitive science to explore a central dilemma: What is the philosophical significance of these changes for us as persons? Should we view at least some Internet systems and applications as potential extensions of ourselves, both as persons and agents: as genuine extended selves, or, Exoselves? Or is it better to see the profiles and personalized systems as, merely appearing to contribute to our cognitive profile, but really undermining our sense of ourselves, our coherence, our agency, and perhaps ultimately our identity as persons? Might our interactions with the Internet really be creating dopplegangers rather than exoselves? This paper discusses the possibilities and constraints of the existence of exoselves and whether the Internet (or the Cloud) serves as a good substrate for extending persons.


Cómo citar
Clowes, R. (2020). THE INTERNET EXTENDED PERSON. LÍMITE Revista Interdisciplinaria De Filosofía Y Psicología. Recuperado a partir de